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ABSTRACT 
Antitrust laws have been notoriously lenient in the patent 
realm, the underlying reason being that patents’ grant of exclusion 
create monopolies that defy antitrust laws in order to incentivize 
innovation.  Thus, antitrust violations have rarely been found in the 
patent cases.  But after the Supreme Court’s holding in FTC v. 
Actavis, brand name pharmaceutical companies may need to be 
more cautious when settling Hatch-Waxman litigation with 
potential patent infringers.  Both brand-name drug manufacturers 
and generic drug manufacturers have incentives to settle cases by 
having the brand-name pay the generic in exchange for delaying 
their entry into the market.  While courts usually found that these 
reverse-payment settlements did not violate antitrust laws, the 
Supreme Court recently held that they sometimes can, even if the 
settlement’s anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the 
exclusionary potential of the patent.  The Court tried to take the 
middle ground after rejecting several bright line rules promulgated 
by appellate courts, including the Third Circuit’s “quick look” 
presumption against reverse payment settlements and the Second, 
Eleventh, and Federal Circuit’s “scope of the patent” test.  This 
note finds that the Supreme Court’s ruling will make the Hatch-
Waxman legal landscape murky and, therefore, difficult for district 
courts to rule on the legality of reverse-payment settlements in the 
future.  The ruling may hinder generics from challenging brand-
name manufacturers, a result that would certainly contravene the 
principle purpose behind the Hatch Waxman Act.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The battle between antitrust and patent affects everyone, though it 
is not readily apparent.  Take the regular drug store visit to pick up a 
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remedy for any common ailment, for example. When looking for a pain 
reliever, does one choose Advil® or the store’s generic brand based on the 
same chemical compound, ibuprofen?  For itchy watery eyes, does one 
choose Clartin® or any drug with the active ingredient loratadine?  What 
makes a customer choose one over the other?  Surely, we are swayed 
somewhat by brand loyalty, the attractive packaging, and advertisements, 
but mostly, it all boils down to the price seen on the shelves.   
 Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act1 in order to prescribe 
special procedures for identifying and resolving patent disputes between 
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers.2  The Hatch-Waxman Act was 
designed to further drug competition by promoting the availability of low-
cost generic drugs through expedited introduction to the market.3  Under the 
Act, generic manufacturers must simply show that their drug has the “same 
active ingredients as” and is “biologically equivalent” to the already 
approved brand-name drug4 in order to bypass the lengthy and expensive 
clinical trials and FDA approval process for a new drug.5  This Act reflects 
the careful balance between properly creating incentives for innovation and 
providing value to consumers.  The patent system rewards brand-name 
manufacturers with a patent for the considerable funds they invest in 
research and development, their resultant inventions, and the creation of a 
beneficial drug for society, but limits the amount of time the brand-name 
manufacturer can have a monopoly in order to allow cost-effective generics 
to enter the market and provide lower healthcare costs for consumers. 
 The enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act created an unintended 
by-product: reverse payment settlements,6 or pay-to-delay settlements, 
between brand-name and generic drug manufacturers.7  Reverse payment 
                                                      
1 Officially, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. 
2 See H.R. Rep. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–17 (1984) (discussing the need to change 
how the drug patent process works). 
3 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).  
4 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) (2012)). 
5 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (allowing 
applicants to use “bioequivalence” in lieu of conducting animal and human studies 
when introducing a new drug). 
6 The term “reverse” refers to the fact that the patent holder is paying the alleged 
infringer, rather than vice versa. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 
187, 205 (2d Cir. 2006). Reverse payments are also sometimes referred to as “pay-
for-delay agreements,” “exclusion payments,” or “brand payments.” 
7 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY FOR DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 3 (2010) [hereinafter FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-
how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-
staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.  
3 THE FTC HAS A DOG IN THE PATENT [Vol. 14 
 
 
settlements are agreements under which the brand-name manufacturer pays 
a rival generic manufacturer to delay their market entry.8  Such agreements 
have created tension between antitrust law and patent law and have spurred 
many heated debates about their legality.9  The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has asserted that “‘[p]ay-for-delay’ agreements are ‘win-win’ for the 
companies: brand-name pharmaceutical prices stay high, and the brand and 
generic share the benefits of the brand’s monopoly profits,” but consumers 
will “miss out on generic prices that can be as much as 90 percent less than 
brand prices.”10  Even Congress has recognized this issue and has made 
several modest attempts at rectifying this loophole.11  However, some courts 
have allowed reverse payments as long as the exclusion of generics falls 
within the patent’s scope, meaning that the settlement does not keep the 
generic drug off the market past the brand name’s patent expiration.12  
Recently, the Third Circuit declined to follow this approach and applied a 
presumption against any settlement involving delayed entry into the market, 
creating a split between the circuits.13   
 Because of the circuit split and Congress’s failure to act, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the reverse payment settlement 
                                                      
8 See id. at 1. 
9 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1555–56 (2006) 
(summarizing the “stark” conflict between the means of antitrust law and those of 
patent law). 
10 FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. 
11 See, e.g., Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995, 
112th Cong. (2012) (proposed bill that would have prohibited pay-for-delay 
agreements). 
12 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1335–36 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing holdings of several circuit courts that allowed  reverse 
payments as long as the exclusion of generics fell within the patent’s scope). Under 
the “scope of the patent” test, reverse payment settlements are deemed permissible 
so long as (1) they do not exceed the scope of a patent, (2) the patent holder's patent 
infringement claim was not objectively baseless, and (3) the patent was not 
procured by fraud. See id. 
13 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug 
Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) and cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. 
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) 
reinstatement granted, No. 2-01-cv-01652, 2013 WL 5180857 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 
2013). The Third Circuit employed the stricter “quick look” rule of reason analysis 
to find that “any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who 
agrees to delay entry into the market [is] prima facie evidence of an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.” Id.  
No. 1]           DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 4 
issue in FTC v. Actavis.14  The Supreme Court found a middle ground, 
holding that reverse payments were not presumptively illegal, but that 
reverse payment settlements in patent infringement litigation could 
sometimes violate the antitrust laws—even if the agreement’s 
anticompetitive effects fell within the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent.15  The Supreme Court also outlined a standard comprised of 
considerations for allowing antitrust law analysis to determine if a reverse 
payment settlement is illegal. 
 This Note will analyze the Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v. 
Actavis and how lower courts should apply the Supreme Court’s standard 
by examining patent and antitrust law principles and the history of reverse 
payment settlements.  Part I delivers a background on reverse payment 
settlements, including the circuit split on the legality of reverse payment 
settlements and the viewpoints of the FTC and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) on the illegality of reverse payment settlements.  Part II provides a 
detailed analysis of the judicial standards adopted by the Supreme Court 
and the strengths and weakness of that approach.  Part II also addresses the 
procedural complications of the Supreme Court’s ruling.  Part III analyzes 
the public policy implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling.  Part IV offers 
proposed solutions to help mitigate any negative effects from the ruling, 
including how lower courts should apply the Supreme Court’s ruling and 
legislative reform. 
I. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act requires the pioneer brand-name drug 
manufacturer to list the “number and the expiration date” of any relevant 
patent in its New Drug Application (NDA),16 and it requires the generic 
drug manufacturer to assure the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that 
the generic will not infringe the brand-name's patents in its Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA).17  The generic manufacturer can provide 
this assurance by requesting approval to market beginning when any still-in-
force patents expire, certifying that the brand-name manufacturer has not 
listed any relevant patents or that any relevant patents have expired.18  
                                                      
14 F.T.C. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012).  The case was formally 
known as FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals. The case name changed because 
generic drug manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. had since changed its 
name to Actavis. 
15 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
16 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (discussing what needs to be included in an 
application for a new drug). 
17 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012). 
18 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012). 
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Alternatively, the generic manufacturer can also seek Paragraph IV19 
certification by claiming that any listed or relevant patent “is invalid or will 
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the drug described in 
the ANDA.20  A Paragraph IV challenge would automatically count as 
patent infringement under the statute21 and often “means provoking 
litigation.”22 
 Further, the Act encourages generic manufactures to take the 
Paragraph IV route by giving the first-to-file company 180 days of generic 
exclusivity starting from the first commercial marketing of its drug.23  
Because no other generic drugs can be marketed during the exclusivity 
period, the generic manufacturer’s potential profits mostly materialize 
during this period and can be worth several hundred million dollars.24  The 
Act also incentivizes the brand-name drug manufacturer to respond to the 
generic’s Paragraph IV certification by providing an automatic stay of FDA 
approval of the ANDA for 30 months if the brand-name files a patent 
infringement lawsuit.25  The brand-name drug manufacturer is also 
motivated to challenge Paragraph IV certification because of its patent and, 
more importantly, its profits have been put at risk. 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act unintentionally created an incentive 
structure for brand-name drug manufacturers and generic drug 
manufacturers to settle patent infringement claims through reverse 
payments, where the brand-name manufacturer pays the generic 
manufacturer to delay a generic’s market entry.26  Because of the significant 
difference between monopoly and competitive drug prices, both 
manufacturers are encouraged to settle litigation through reverse payments 
in the current landscape.27  Generic manufacturer profits are much less than 
what brand-name manufacturers stand to lose, which allows brand-name 
manufacturers to settle litigation by offering generic manufacturers a split of 
the monopoly profits—an offer that ends up costing more money than what 
the generic manufacturer would have made by entering the market.28  Both 
the FTC and DOJ, the federal antitrust enforcement agencies, have 
steadfastly maintained that reverse payments are a violation of antitrust laws 
                                                      
19 Because it stems from the fourth paragraph of this statute’s section, this type of 
challenge is commonly known as the “Paragraph IV” route, which requires the 
generic drug manufacture to certify that any listed, relevant patent “is invalid or 
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic drug. 
20 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
21 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
22 Caraco Pharm. Labs, 132 S. Ct. at 1677. 
23 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). 
24 Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1579.  
25 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012). 
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as the settlement extends the patent holder’s monopoly.29  Furthermore, the 
agencies argue that the delay of generic drugs produces a negative 
economic impact on pharmaceutical drug consumers due to the monopoly 
pricing set by the brand-name drug manufacturers.30  Nevertheless, courts 
have generally found that reverse payment settlements do not violate 
antitrust laws so long as they do not extend the brand-name’s monopoly 
past patent expiration.31  By contrast, the Third and Sixth Circuits have 
adopted a vastly different approach and found reverse payment settlements 
to be presumptively illegal.32  While Congress could resolve this by 
                                                                                                                         
26 See FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 3. 
27 See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data 
and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 635–36 
(2009) (discussing the drug manufacturer’s incentive to settle). 
28 Id.  
29 See FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2; Confirmation Hearings 
on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 618 (2009) (statement of Christine Varney, nominee for Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice) (stating DOJ’s full 
support of the FTC’s position against reverse payment settlements). 
30 Consumers will “miss out on generic prices that can be as much as 90 percent 
less than brand prices” and “[p]ay-for-delay agreements have significantly 
postponed substantial consumer savings from lower generic drug prices.” FTC, PAY 
FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
31 See, generally, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), 
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012) and rev’d and remanded sub nom. FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that absent sham litigation or fraud in 
obtaining patent, reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so 
long as its anticompetitive effects fall within scope of exclusionary potential of 
patent); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that 
brand-name manufacturer acted within its rights as patentee when it agreed to make 
payments to generic manufacturers in exchange for an agreement not to market 
generic version of drug until patent expired); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013) (requiring patent holder to make reverse payments to generic drug 
manufacturer in a settlement agreement would not be unlawful under Sherman Act 
even if it required reverse payments in an amount more than either party anticipated 
generic manufacturer would earn by winning lawsuit); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that brand-name 
manufacturer’s agreements with generics manufacturers to not market generic 
version until patents expired or were held invalid, in exchange for cash payments, 
was not a per se violation of Sherman Act prohibition on contracts in restraint of 
trade). 
32 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying the 
rule of reason test to find the reverse payment agreement at issue per se illegal); In 
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (same).  
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amending the Hatch-Waxman Act, they have yet to pass any legislative 
solutions.  
 In order to better understand how the reverse payment system was 
created, section A will outline the incentives that Congress provided 
generics in the Hatch-Waxman Act.  To understand why reverse payments 
arrive at such disparate analysis by the courts, section B will analyze the 
clash between antitrust law and patent law and section C details the FTC’s 
and DOJ’s view that started the litigation in the first place.  Section D will 
analyze the circuit split and the two main tests employed by the courts 
before Actavis, which caused tension as to whether a settlement was 
allowed under patent law and antitrust law. 
A. The Creation of Reverse Payment Settlements 
 Pharmaceutical manufacturers must function within the framework 
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.33  In order for a 
pharmaceutical drug to be approved by the FDA, the manufacturer must 
submit a New Drug Application (NDA), which demands a multitude of 
information on the drug’s safety, efficacy, and method of production, and 
disclosure of any patents related to its composition or methods of use.34  
This is an extensive, time-consuming review process that requires 
significant development costs and intensive, multi-phase clinical trial 
testing.35  Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug manufacturer 
could not legally develop a generic version of a brand-name drug until the 
patent expired.36  Furthermore, once the patent expired, the generic drug 
would have to obtain FDA approval through the same extensive NDA 
process.37   The duplicative nature of this process eroded the incentives for 
manufacturers to develop generics.38   
                                                      
33 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
34 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (describing what must be contained in application to 
introduce a new drug into interstate commerce). 
35 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30756, 
PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION 
ACT OF 1984 (“THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT”) 20 (2005). 
36 See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
superseded by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006)), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff'd, 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
37 SCHACT & THOMAS, supra note 35, at 20. 
38 See id. (noting that generic drug manufactures would have to undertake 
significant costs to get generic drugs on the market). 
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1. Congress’s Incentive Structure to Promote Generics.  
  In order to promote the research and development of competing 
drugs, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, giving generic drug 
manufacturers three major incentives: the safe-harbor provision, the ANDA, 
and the 180-day exclusivity period.39  The safe-harbor provision under Title 
II of the Act allows manufactures to use the patented invention “solely for 
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information” 
to the FDA without infringing the patent.40  This allows the generic drug 
manufacturer to conduct testing to establish bioequivalency—the same 
active ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, strength, etc.—
before the patent expires so that the generic can be launched quickly after 
the patent’s expiration.41  The second benefit under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
ANDA, allows generic manufacturers who establish bioequivalency to rely 
on, or “piggyback,”42 the FDA’s finding of safety and efficacy for that 
drug.43  By not having to go through the costly and time-consuming NDA 
approval process, the manufacturer’s initial investment into developing a 
generic drug decreases dramatically.44 
 Finally, generic manufacturers have an incentive to challenge the 
brand-name drug’s patents45 in order to receive exclusivity against other 
competing drugs from entering the market for 180 days46 with minimal 
risk.47  Known as the “Paragraph IV” route,48 the first-to-file ANDA 
                                                      
39 FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 3. The Hatch-Waxman Act was 
passed as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 
70b (2006); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-360 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 
156, 271, 282 (2006)). 
40 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).  
41 See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 
2692 (“[T]he only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of 
testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic 
substitute. The patent holder retains the right to exclude others from the major 
commercial marketplace during the life of the patent. Thus, the nature of the 
interference with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial.”). 
42 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). 
43 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012). 
44 See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug 
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 617–18 (2011) (estimating the cost of 
preparing and filing an ANDA to be $1 million). 
45 See id.  
46 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I). 
47 As long as the generic manufacturer does not market the product, it will face 
minimal liability for infringement because there generally are no damages if the 
product was never sold. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic 
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applicant certifies that any listed, relevant patent “is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic drug.49  Once 
initiated, the patent owner has forty-five days to initiate infringement 
litigation and if the patent owner fails to respond, the ANDA applicant can 
market the drug without infringing on the underlying patent.50   
2. 180-day Exclusivity Period:  A Perverse Incentive.   
 While the Hatch-Waxman Act theoretically created notable 
incentives for greater production of generic drugs, the 180-day exclusivity 
period eventually pushed both the generic manufacturer and brand-name 
manufacturer to settle using reverse payments.  The exclusivity period 
drives the generic manufacturer because the exclusivity period begins after 
the first-to-file generic manufacturer markets the drug or after a court finds 
that the patent is invalid or not infringed.51  The brand-name manufacturer is 
spurred to settle because the grant of exclusivity does not expire.52  This 
means that the reverse payment settlement scheme not only delays the first-
to-file generic manufacturer’s entry into the market, but also prevents any 
other generic manufacturer from entering the market until after the patent 
expires unless they go through the FDA’s NDA process, which is cost 
prohibitive.53 Other generic manufacturers could also file a subsequent 
Paragraph IV challenge, but this rarely, if ever, happens.  The second-
comers have little incentive to file a subsequent Paragraph IV challenge 
without a grant of exclusivity as a possible reward because of the high cost 
and risk associated with patent litigation.   
 The brand-name manufacturers settle litigation by offering the first-
to-file generic manufacturer significant monetary compensation, more than 
the profitability of generics and less than the loss of the brand-name’s 
market share, in exchange for the generic to delay entry into the market and 
                                                                                                                         
Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 264 (2012).  
48 This is referred to as the “Paragraph IV” route because it falls under the fourth 
paragraph of the relevant statutory section, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) 
(2012).  Alternatively, the ANDA applicant can file under paragraphs I-III, where 
the applicant certifies that the brand-name manufacturer failed to file the relevant 
patents, the patents expired, or approval is being sought effective on a date after 
patent expiration. See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(III) (2012).  
49 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
50 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I) (2012); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1) (2012). 
51 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5) (2012). 
52 See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual 
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2003). 
53 See id. 
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to “park” its grant of 180-day exclusivity.54  In the end, this incentive causes 
a brand-name manufacturer to settle only with a generic manufacturer that 
has been approved for the 180-day exclusivity period because the first-to-
file generic can exercise its exclusivity period whenever they want. 
B. The Clash Between Patent Law and Antitrust Law 
 The Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) prohibits businesses 
from contracting, combining, and conspiring to restrain trade or commerce 
to encourage competitive markets and promote consumer welfare.55  On the 
other hand, a patent grants “the right to exclude others from profiting by the 
patented invention”56 and is an exception to the general rule against 
monopolies and to the right of access to a free and open market.57  Patents 
therefore grant patent holders a time-limited monopoly without fear of 
antitrust liabilities.58 
 The Sherman Act prohibits only “unreasonable restraints on 
competition” under the rule of reason standard, whereby the company’s 
behavior is analyzed under an “elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness” in 
context of a particular industry.59  Because the rule of reason standard is not 
a bright-line rule and consumes considerable time and resources to litigate, 
the Supreme Court has ruled certain agreements per se illegal under the 
Sherman Act.60  These standards have been imported into how the circuit 
courts decided antitrust violations in the Hatch-Waxman context by creating 
the “scope of the patent” test and “quick look” rule of reason test explained 
in section D. 
 In the patent law realm, a patent is presumptively valid and the 
burden of proving invalidity rests on the challenging party.61  In the Hatch-
Waxman context, the generic manufacturer filing the ANDA must show 
                                                      
54 See id. 
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (proscribing all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies 
in restraint of trade). 
56 Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). 
57 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
58 See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926) (“It is only when 
[the patentee] . . . steps out of the scope of his patent rights . . . that he comes within 
the operation of the [Sherman] Act.”).  
59 Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (citing United 
States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898)). 
60 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (holding that “there are 
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”). 
61 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
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that the brand-name patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence.62   
Therefore, implications related to the enforcement of antitrust laws only 
apply when the settlement of Hatch-Waxman litigation falls outside of the 
rights granted by the patent or when the patent is invalid.  Because of the 
major difference between the two spheres of law, it is possible that antitrust 
laws might not provide the most suitable vehicle for policing reverse 
payment agreements. 
C. FTC and DOJ’s Stance on Reverse Payment Settlements 
 The FTC has long been aware of reverse payment settlements and 
always opposed their potential to be over-extended, but it was not until 
recently that the FTC was concerned with the anticompetitive implications 
of reverse payments.63  Insisting that “[p]ay-for-delay agreements have 
significantly postponed substantial consumer savings from lower generic 
drug prices[,]” the agency has strenuously opposed pay-to-delay deals as 
anticompetitive and ultimately harmful for US consumers.64  The FTC has 
equated reverse payment agreements with horizontal market allocation 
agreements, which are ordinarily per se antitrust violations when no patent 
is involved.65  Therefore, the FTC views reverse payment settlements as 
presumptively illegal. 
 The FTC has said that any exemption from antitrust law that patent 
settlements receive normally do not apply if the patent is invalid or does not 
cover the restricted activities.66  The FTC has demonstrated its skepticism 
regarding the presumption of patent validity, stating a firm “certain that a 
patent was valid . . . would have no incentive whatsoever to pay another 
                                                      
62 Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) aff’d, 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
63 Reverse payment settlement agreement in the Hatch-Waxman context is not a 
new phenomenon. For example, the FTC Generic Drug Study identifies one that 
was executed in March 1993, and there were probably prior reverse payment 
settlements.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 31 (2002). 
64 FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
65 See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (quoting 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (observing that an 
agreement between competitors to allocate territories with no purpose other than to 
reduce competition is a “classic example” of a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act)). 
66 Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 30 (FTC  
Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
cases/2003/12/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 
2005); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 
548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273) [hereinafter FTC Petition for Certiorari]. 
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firm to stay out of the market.”67  Therefore, the FTC’s rule “would make 
almost any settlement involving a payment illegal.”68 
 On the other hand, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ initially 
approved of reverse payment settlements, viewing the payments as a 
legitimate enforcement of the patent holder’s rights.69  Due to changes in the 
administration and department leadership, in 2008, the DOJ finally adopted 
a similar stance to that of the FTC’s, opposing reverse payment 
settlements.70  The DOJ asserted that “[t]he anticompetitive potential of 
reverse payments . . . is sufficiently clear that such agreements should be 
treated as presumptively unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”71  
The DOJ further stated that “[l]iability properly turns on whether, in 
avoiding the prospect of invalidation that accompanies infringement 
litigation, the parties have by contract obtained more exclusion than 
warranted in light of that prospect.”72  
 Currently, the government has a strong cohesive stance against 
reverse payment settlements.  The FTC, with the support of the DOJ and the 
executive branch, will undoubtedly continue to strongly pursue cases 
involving reverse payment settlements under its position that reverse 
payment settlements are per se violations of antitrust law. 
D. The Circuit Splitting Headache that Has Tormented Settlements 
 The case law regarding reverse payment settlements is definitively 
split between patent rights and antitrust concerns.  This divergence is 
illustrated by the clashing positions taken by the Third Circuit and the 
Eleventh Circuit on the same reverse payment settlement for the same drug 
patent, K-Dur.  Three other circuits—the Second, Sixth, and the Federal 
Circuits—have ruled on this issue, also disagreeing on the proper balance 
between the rights of the patent holder and the importance of enforcing 
antitrust law’s purpose. 
1. “Scope of the Patent” Test. 
                                                      
67 See FTC Petition for Certiorari, supra note 66 at 18 (quoting 12 HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046, at 339 (Supp. 2004)). 
68 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005). 
69 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8–9, FTC v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273). 
70 Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 9–10, Ark. 
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 
05-2851-cv(L), 05-2852-cv(CON), 05-2863-cv(CON)). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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 The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits evaluate antitrust 
claims concerning reverse payment settlements under the “scope of the 
patent” test.73  These courts allowed reverse payment settlements as long as 
the settlement’s terms fell within the exclusionary scope of the brand-name 
manufacturer’s patent.74  Under this analysis, reverse payment settlements 
are deemed permissible so long as (1) they do not exceed the scope of a 
patent, (2) the patent holder’s patent infringement claim was not objectively 
baseless, and (3) the patent was not procured by fraud.75   
 The courts reasoned that a patent holder could contract within the 
patent’s term because a patent grants its owner the right to exclude others 
from making or selling the invention by statute.76  Therefore, reverse 
payment settlements would not usually exceed the patent’s scope so long as 
the generic drug’s entry into the market was not delayed longer than the 
expiration of the patent.77  Furthermore, settlements would fall within the 
patent’s scope because the essence of the reverse payment agreement was to 
exclude generic manufacturers from profiting from patented invention.78  
Finally, the courts reasoned that the “scope of the patent” test supported 
public policy by encouraging settlements and judicial efficiency.79  
2. “Quick Look” Rule of Reason Test.   
 Conversely, the Third and Sixth Circuits have adopted the “quick 
look” rule of reason test.80  Examining the economic realities of the reverse 
payment settlement, these courts held that any payment made by the patent 
holder to the generic challenger who agreed to delayed entry into the market 
was prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.81  Therefore, 
the parties bear the burden to rebut this presumption by showing that the 
                                                      
73 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d 
Cir. 2005); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066–67 (11th Cir. 
2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
74 See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1335–36. 
75 See id. 
76 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 
F.3d at 1337; In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208–09.   
77 See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337; In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208–09. 
78 See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337. 
79 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072–73 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976)); see 
also In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333. 
80 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012); In re Cardizem 
CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003). 
81 In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. 
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payment was for a purpose other than delayed entry or offered some 
“procompetitive benefit.”82  An example of a procompetitive benefit is “a 
modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved generic drug company to 
avoid bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug.”83 
 The “quick look” rule of reason analysis followed the approach that 
was initially suggested by the D.C. Circuit and supported the court’s 
conclusion that “[a] payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging 
generic firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties 
entering the agreement . . . .”84  This test relies upon antitrust law’s scrutiny 
of anticompetitive behavior, which stands in stark contrast to the “scope of 
the patent” test, which relies on patent law’s exclusionary rights and 
presumption of patent validity.85  The Third Circuit justified this approach 
by reasoning that it would protect consumers from unjustified monopolies 
and align with Hatch-Waxman’s public policy objectives.86  Unlike the 
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, the Third Circuit determined that 
Hatch-Waxman’s intent to protect consumers overrode a judicial preference 
for encouraging settlements.87 
II. FTC V. ACTAVIS:  ANTITRUST NOW HAS A BITE TO GO WITH ITS 
BARK 
 Because of the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in FTC v. Actavis in order to find a middle ground between the two 
juxtaposing viewpoints.  This section will outline the Court’s holding 
and the considerations employed in its ruling.  Then, the Court’s opinion 
is analyzed for its effective and practical outcomes.  While the Supreme 
Court’s attempt to strike an appropriate balance between patent law and 
antitrust law is laudable, its holding leaves much more to be desired, as 
the test it employed is open-ended and leaves the lower courts with a 
nebulous path to fumble through. 
A. The Supreme Court’s “Rule of Reason” Test 
 In FTC v. Actavis, the FTC challenged the reverse payment 
settlement between the brand-name manufacturer and generics 
manufacturer of a synthetic testosterone sold under the name AndroGel as 
an antitrust violation.  Under the settlement agreement, the brand-name 
                                                      
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 808 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
85 See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218; In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337. 
86 See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217–18. 
87 See id. 
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manufacturer agreed to pay the generics manufacturers millions of dollars in 
exchange for the generics not entering into the market for 65 months, when 
the AndroGel patent expired.88  This was a classic reverse payment 
settlement case where large sums of money were exchanged for the 
generics’ delayed market entry. 
 The Supreme Court attempted to find the middle ground between 
the disparate “scope of the patent” and “quick look” rule of reason tests 
promulgated by the circuit courts.  The court held that the desirability of 
settlements is outweighed by considerations related to anticompetitive 
effects: 
In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with 
it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a 
payment may be unable to explain and to justify it; such a firm or 
individual may well possess market power derived from the patent; a 
court, by examining the size of the payment, may well be able to 
assess its likely anticompetitive effects along with its potential 
justifications without litigating the validity of the patent; and parties 
may well find ways to settle patent disputes without the use of reverse 
payments. In our view, these considerations, taken together, outweigh 
the single strong consideration—the desirability of settlements—that 
led the Eleventh Circuit to provide near-automatic antitrust immunity 
to reverse payment settlements.89 
While the Court expressly overruled the “scope of the patent” test, the Court 
also did not accept the premise that the payment settlement was per se 
illegal or was prima facie evidence of anticompetitive behavior.  But, the 
Court did accept the Third Circuit’s reasoning that the legality of the 
settlement should be measured by “procompetitive antitrust policies,” rather 
than “patent law policy.”90  
 The Court outlined five considerations under an antitrust law 
analysis to determine the legality of a reverse payment settlement: 
(1) the reverse payment’s “potential for genuine adverse 
effects on competition;” 
(2) whether the reverse payment’s “anticompetitive 
consequences . . . prove unjustified;” 
                                                      
88 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
89 Id. 
90 Id.  
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(3) “where a reverse payment threatens to work 
unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee[’s] . . . 
power to bring that harm about in practice;” 
(4) administrative efficiency;91 
(5) the ability for the parties to settle their lawsuit without 
a reverse payment92.93  
 The Court ruled that the rule of reason test should be used as in 
other antitrust cases, but also implicitly suggested that the full rule of reason 
approach associated with Chicago Board of Trade94 may not be necessary.95  
Further, the Court left the decision to the lower courts as to which 
considerations to use and how those considerations should be weighed in 
applying the rule of reason analysis.96  While the Court clearly overruled the 
“scope of patent” test and held that antitrust laws should measure the 
payment’s legality rather than patent law policy, it nevertheless created a 
murky standard that could deem a reverse payment illegal under antitrust 
law, even if the settlement’s anticompetitive effects fell within the scope of 
the exclusionary potential of the patent.  
B. Uncertainty Will Lead to Inconsistent Rulings  
 The question left unanswered by the Supreme Court is how lower 
courts should apply the Actavis ruling in future reverse payment settlement 
cases.  All of the circuit courts’ approaches were rejected, and the Court did 
not develop any concrete replacement.  The Court left too much unclear 
with its vague holding that reverse payment settlements should be analyzed 
somewhere in between the “quick look” rule of reason and “scope of the 
patent” tests.  Primarily, lower courts are left with the decision on how they 
should use the five considerations and how those considerations should be 
                                                      
91 The Court states consideration four as whether “an antitrust action is likely to 
prove more feasible administratively.” Id. 
92 The Court states consideration five as whether “a large, unjustified reverse 
payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their 
lawsuit.” Id. 
93 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
94 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
95 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
96 Id. at 2238 (“[T]rial courts can structure antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on the 
one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, 
and, on the other, consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the 
minimal light it may shed on the basic question—that of the presence of significant 
unjustified anticompetitive consequences. We therefore leave to the lower courts 
the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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weighed and applied to the existing rule of reason analysis.  In addition, the 
following issues remain unresolved as to how to apply the rule of reason 
test:  when and to what extent the validity of the patent will need to be 
tested, what types of direct economic evidence to consider when assessing 
the anticompetitive effects, what indirect evidence will serve as the most 
useful evidence of anticompetitive effects, whether market definition will 
play a meaningful role, and how courts will analyze potential efficiencies.  
1. The Supreme Court May Have Effectively Adopted the “Quick Look” 
Rule of Reason. 
 The majority opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the 
structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”97  Yet, the 
Supreme Court definitively asserted that an antitrust solution is appropriate 
in resolving the issues with reverse payment settlements.98  Some 
commentators have noted that, in effect, the Court’s decision essentially 
accepted the “quick look” rule of reason approach.99  If true, the Court did 
not do so explicitly because the Court acknowledges, albeit quite 
skeptically, that not all reverse payment settlements are anti-competitive.   
 Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, and Carl 
Shapiro in Activating Actavis assert that the Court’s ruling means that the 
parties to the challenged reverse payment settlement must show that the 
settlement leads to earlier or more competition than a settlement without the 
reverse payment.100  If the Court’s ruling does force the parties to defend the 
reverse payment settlement only by demonstrating the procompetitive 
effects of the settlement, then we really are in a world more like the “quick 
look” rule of reason approach.101  But, this simply cannot be the case.  
Direct evidence of the strength of the patent at issue must be an overarching 
consideration.  If strong evidence of patent validity were not persuasive, 
then the protections given by patents would no longer be as strong as they 
have been since the inception of our patent system.  Adopting the “quick 
look” rule of reason approach would not allow consideration of the fact that 
the brand-name manufacturer is risk-averse and would rather settle 
litigation than risk their patent to be invalidated.  Even when the patent is 
strong and there’s little chance of invalidation, the risk of losing millions of 
dollars’ worth of profits would give any brand-name manufacturer pause to 
consider splitting some of its profits.   
                                                      
97 Id. at 2238. 
98 Id. 
99 See Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 21 (Fall 2013). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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 Perhaps the Court wanted to draw the line in the middle of the 
circuit split, but in practice, its ruling can make any patent litigation 
settlement appear to be a pay-for-delay whenever the generic does not enter 
the market immediately.  This could actually harm the consumers, a result 
contrary to the Court’s intent, because a reverse settlement in the context of 
a strong patent could actually bring a generic drug to the market sooner than 
otherwise expected.  The generics could be available sooner than the 
expiration of the patent when there is a high chance of a validity finding 
with a strong patent.  Whatever the underlying intent of the Supreme Court, 
the holding ultimately leaves the decision to be made by the lower courts.  
As a consequence, the uncertainty on how these courts will rule could result 
in another circuit split. 
2. The Circuit Splitting Headache Still Exists. 
 The circuit courts clearly showed a preference for the outliers of the 
spectrum, which could lead to further inconsistencies between the 
circuits.102  District courts may find that their jurisdiction’s appellate court 
will “stick to their guns” and rule as closely to their previous holdings as 
possible while still falling within Actavis, thereby ruling inconsistently 
across the United States.  More troubling, lower courts could struggle to 
rule consistently against the long-established judicial preference for settling 
cases. 
 For example, the Third and Sixth Circuits, which adopted the 
“quick look” rule of reason approach, can apply strong criteria close to a 
full-blown rule of reason analysis that would allow the vast majority of 
reverse payment settlements to be found illegal.103  On the other hand, the 
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, which adopted the “scope of the 
patent” approach, can apply weaker criteria so as to allow more flexibility 
in finding reverse payment settlements legal.104  With different jurisdictions 
yielding widely disparate results, generic and brand-name manufacturers 
might agree to litigate—and thereby settle—in reverse settlement preferred 
jurisdictions and encourage a flood of Hatch-Waxman cases on those 
jurisdictions’ dockets. 
                                                      
102 See supra Part I.C. 
103 See supra Part I.C.2. 
104 See supra Part I.C.1. 
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III.  ANTITRUST’S BITE MAY SCARE OFF BAD PATENTS BUT CAN 
ALSO KILL SETTLEMENTS, EFFICIENCY AND POSSIBLY GENERIC 
CHALLENGES 
 Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to promote consumer 
access to low cost generics.  “Cheaper generic drugs have saved purchasers 
billions of dollars per year—an estimated $1 trillion in the United States 
over the past decade, according to an industry-sponsored study—which 
makes such drugs a powerful way to keep down heath-care costs.”105  The 
other goal of Hatch-Waxman was to provide incentives for generic 
manufacturers to challenge brand-name patents in order to clean up the 
prevalence of bad patents, which damages society as a whole.106  Reverse 
payment settlements arguably bypass both of these goals by delaying 
generics from the market and halting the determination of the validity of the 
original patents at issue.  But, these settlements could also help in the 
context of stronger patents as Paragraph IV challenges typically are for 
secondary patents: patents that are not for the original chemical compound 
or active ingredients of the drug, but for the other improvements of the 
drug, i.e. dosage amount.  By hindering reverse payment settlements, 
generic manufacturers have no incentive to challenge these arguably 
stronger patents. Perhaps generic manufacturers would stay out of 
Paragraph IV challenges completely because of the increased costs 
associated with the increased chance that the FTC would challenge any 
settlement.  
A. Secondary Patents Are the Major Source of Harm  
 Brand-name manufacturers attempt to extend the patent exclusivity 
of their drugs through the process of “evergreening,” or filing secondary 
patents.107  Secondary patents protect supplementary aspects of drug 
                                                      
105 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339 
SCIENCE 1386, 1386 (2013) (citing to a study conducted by IMS Health for the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association); see also GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, GENERIC 
DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 1 (2014) (estimating that the savings are over $1.5 
trillion over the past decade). 
106 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984) (explaining that allowing early generic 
challenges “fairly balance[d]” the exclusionary rights of patent owners with the 
“rights of third parties” to contest validity and market products not covered by the 
patent); see also Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced 
Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2006). 
107 See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug 
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 959–62 (2011) 
(“This practice became known as ‘evergreening’ because the patentee could refresh 
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innovation, such as particular drug formulations and compositions, beyond 
the fundamental protection of a novel active ingredient given by the primary 
(traditional) patent.  The rise of the total number of patents is in large part 
due to the rise of secondary patents, but unfortunately, they are also 
responsible for the increasing number of bad patents.108   
 While secondary patents do, in large part, provide great societal 
value and promote improvements and further innovations, they are less 
likely to meet legal standards of patent validity.  Therefore, generic 
manufacturers target these “bad” or “weak” secondary patents in order to 
enter the market before patent expiration.109  Secondary patents are seen as 
less onerous bars for generics to entry into the market, and consequently, it 
is beneficial for generics to challenge secondary patents under Hatch-
Waxman, to release generic drugs on the market when they are supposed to 
be, and to help eliminate bad patents from our system.110  By allowing 
generic manufacturers to challenge secondary patents, the system enables 
the often-overloaded U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to review 
bad patents by allowing for a second look after the bad patents’ initial 
approval. 
B. Generics’ Entry into the Market Could Even Be Delayed, Contrary 
to the Act’s Entire Purpose 
 Reverse payment settlements, without a doubt, have negative 
effects on consumers if the generic manufacturer can defeat the brand-name 
manufacturer’s patent; however, this perspective is just one side of the coin.  
Often, the brand-name manufacturer wins the patent infringement litigation, 
which results in generic entry only after patent expiration.111  Of the cases 
that go to trial and do not settle, the brand-name manufacturer wins 92% of 
the time when the litigation involves a primary patent and 32% of the time 
                                                                                                                         
its stay by periodically adding a new patent to the Orange Book, no matter how 
weak the patent or how little it related to the defendant’s product”).   
108 Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: 
Developing a Public Health Perspective viii (Jan. 2007) (working paper)  
(noting that “in the 12-years period 1989-2000, just 153 (15%) of all  
new drug approvals were medicines providing a significant  
clinical improvement”) (internal citation omitted) (available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2008/06/correa_patentability20guid 
elines.pdf). 
109 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 105, 1386–87. 
110 Id. 
111 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 20–21 (2014); see 
also ADAM GREENE & D. DEWEY STEADMAN, RBC CAPITAL MKTS., 
PHARMACEUTICALS: ANALYZING LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 4 (2010).  
21 THE FTC HAS A DOG IN THE PATENT [Vol. 14 
 
 
when it involves a secondary patent.112  So, for the vast majority of primary 
patent cases and a sizeable number of secondary patent cases, a reverse 
settlement payment could have allowed the generic to come on the market 
sooner than they would have under the patent life.   
 Using the Actavis case as the poignant example, AndroGel is 
protected by a patent that expires in 2021 and settlement in that case 
allowed the generic to be available in 2015.113  The settlement allowed 
consumers to be able to access the generic six years earlier than if the 
brand-name manufacturer won at trial, and the brand-name manufacturer 
had a strong possibility of doing so.  AndroGel’s patent was arguably 
strong.  The FDA approved the NDA for AndroGel in 2000.114  In January 
2003, the USPTO issued U.S. Patent No. 6,503,894 (‘894 patent), which 
expressly disclosed the AndroGel formulation.115  AndroGel has become a 
great medical and commercial success, providing needed treatment to 
millions of patients and generating nearly $875 million in sales in 2011.116  
Furthermore, the patent in that dispute was not a secondary patent, which is 
the strongest argument for support of the reverse payment settlement in this 
case.  In settlements where substantial probability of patent validity exists 
such as the one in Actavis, reverse payment settlements may benefit 
consumers by providing the generic challenger with a market entry date 
much earlier than the patent’s expiration. 
C. Litigation, Settlements, and Innovation Will Be Chilled if Waters 
Remain Murky 
 The murkiness brought on by Actavis may discourage generic drug 
companies from bringing Paragraph IV challenges.  Moreover, if the 
generics still decide to challenge brand-names’ patents, litigation 
settlements would be chilled due to fear of antitrust liability as the FTC and 
DOJ now have more ammunition to challenge even more agreements.  
Undoubtedly, the FTC will express no hesitation in challenging any patent 
settlement that has any hint of anticompetitive behavior in the wake of 
Actavis, particularly given its position that transferring anything of value 
from the brand-name drug manufacturer to a generic competitor should 
merit antitrust scrutiny.117  In addition to forcing brand-name manufacturers 
                                                      
112 Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 105, at 1386–87.  
113 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 ABBOTT LABS., ABBOTT 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 52 (2011), available at 
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/94/94004/Proxy_Page/AR2011.pdf. 
117 See Brief for the Petitioner, FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (Jan. 22, 2013) (No. 
12-416). 
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to defend even their strong patents, the FTC’s fighting power gives brand-
name manufacturers little incentive to settle cases with generic 
manufacturers because the best defense to an antitrust challenge is to 
establish the validity of the patent, which can only be established through 
patent litigation.  
 Reverse payment settlements have been a common part of patent 
litigation over the last ten years or more, and in the 2012 fiscal year, the 
FTC reported there were 40 reverse payment agreements among 140 “final 
resolutions” of ANDA litigation.118  Uncertainty could lead to a different 
litigation dynamic, in which generic challengers are less able to seek or 
obtain settlements that they would consider beneficial to their business.  
Further, there would be no incentive to settle if, immediately after settling, 
the parties would have to go through the whole rigmarole again and litigate 
the same issue of the patent’s validity to defend against an antitrust suit.  
Simply put, there is essentially no advantage to settling when the law is 
murky.  The landscape post-Actavis forces parties to litigate their cases fully 
through time-consuming trials, thereby incurring greater costs and risk that 
deters rather than incentivizes generic challenges.119    
 Patent litigation is particularly complex, costly, and uncertain.  
Generally, if a patent case goes to trial, legal fees alone will cost each side 
$1.5 million.120  But a generic challenging a brand-name patent case costs 
about $10 million per suit on average.121  Settlements can provide efficient 
resolutions to otherwise lengthy, complex, and costly trials.  Reverse 
                                                      
118 FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, 
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF  
AGREEMENTS FILED IN FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130117mmareport.pdf. 
119 See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 
43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1125 (2010). 
120 1 H. HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 7.1c, 2014 WL 3738869, at *2 
n.6 (Nov. 2013) (But, “[t]oday that number is in excess of $5 million per side.” 
(citing Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, 34 (2013)); 
see also Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, IP Watchdog (Feb. 
5, 2013) (“[T]he cost of an average patent lawsuit, where $1 million to $25 million 
is at risk, is $1.6 million through the end of discovery and $2.8 million through 
final disposition”) available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-
costs-of-patent-litigation/id=34808/. 
121 Michael R. Herman, note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic 
Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1832 n. 41 (2011) (citing MARC GOODMAN ET AL., MORGAN 
STANLEY EQUITY RESEARCH, QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT FROM AUTHORIZED 
GENERICS 9 (2004)). 
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payment settlements provide these same benefits and more.  Of the cases 
that proceed to trial, the brand-name manufacturer often wins.122  This 
means that a reverse payment settlement in those situations would have 
allowed a generic to come on the market sooner than they would have under 
the patent life.  As discussed earlier, in the Actavis case, AndroGel is 
protected by a patent that expires in 2021.123  Settlement in that case 
allowed the generic to be available in 2015, six years earlier than if the case 
went to trial and the patent was found to be valid.124  It is important to keep 
in mind that these patents are presumed to be valid in the first place, and “a 
valid patent excludes all except its owner from the use of the protected 
process or product.”125  
 Given the Hatch-Waxman Act’s reallocation of litigation risk, 
reverse payment settlements can be efficient resolutions to the otherwise 
lengthy and complex trials in Paragraph IV disputes.126  If reverse payment 
settlements are no longer an option to parties, in this time of uncertainty, 
cases are more likely to go to trial or generics might not file under 
Paragraph IV at all, opting for easier, cheaper, and less risky administrative 
alternatives which would cause generics to not be available until the patent 
was due to expire anyway.  If cases proceed to trial more often, generic 
manufacturers’ profits may not be able to cover the continuing legal bills 
and brand-name manufacturers may not have enough profits to feed back 
into the growing costs of research and development for new drugs.127   
D. The Actavis Ruling Could Hinder Settlement Incentives in Other 
Contexts 
 The Actavis opinion has broader implications for the basic 
intersection of antitrust and patent law.  Reverse payment settlements can 
                                                      
122 GREENE & STEADMAN, supra note 111, at 4. 
123 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
124 Id. 
125 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948). 
126 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 
677 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012) (describing patent litigation as an 
“infamously costly and notoriously unpredictable process”); Schering-Plough Corp. 
v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[t]here is no question 
that settlements provide a number of private and social benefits as opposed to the 
inveterate and costly effects of litigation”); Mullally, supra note 119, at 1125. 
127 Paying Off Generics to Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs: Should It 
Be Prohibited?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 18 
(2007) (statement of Billy Tauzin, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America). 
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also arise in the context of patent interference disputes.128 Under a broad 
reading of Actavis, any settlement agreement between generics and brand-
name manufacturers could be subject to antitrust challenge: a lower court 
could reasonably read the decision as indicating that any settlement by 
which the challenging generic obtained benefits that it otherwise would not 
have gained should be subject to antitrust evaluation.  This could even 
affect licensing agreements, where terms and conditions, especially “field of 
use” restrictions, will face greater scrutiny from antitrust review. 
 On the beneficial side, the opinion fuels support for the FTC to 
increase antitrust scrutiny against “patent trolls,” also known as patent 
assertion entities or non-practicing entities.  Patent trolling is probably the 
hottest issue in intellectual property law today, and these entities have an 
adverse impact on competition and consumers.129  The Actavis decision 
could mean that agreements with patent holders to acquire or pool their 
patents would be subject to antitrust review based on two parts of the 
Court’s reasoning.  First, that patent protection from antitrust challenge 
turns “in important part” on “the public interest in granting patent 
monopolies [that] exist[] only to the extent that the public is given a novel 
and useful invention in consideration for its grant.”130   Second, that 
antitrust laws might be violated by a cross licensing agreement among 
patent holders even if the patents are valid and enforceable if the patent 
holders had “curtailed the manufacture and supply of an unpatented 
product.”131  Because patent trolls are in its essence entities that do not 
practice their patents, this may be an important tool to curtail patent trolling 
by allowing the FTC to ask whether the patent troll, in acquiring rights to a 
patent, is furthering the public interest in the “novel and useful invention” 
or harming the public interest by curtailing “the manufacture and supply of 
an unpatented product.”  
                                                      
128 See, e.g., Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
rev’d on other grounds and remanded, 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
129 See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing 
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014) (discussing the 
seismic change in patent litigation in large part due to the rise of “patent troll” 
cases). 
130 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013) (quoting United States v. 
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 199 (1963)) (internal quotations removed). 
131 Id. at 2233 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 
(1931)). 
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IV.  JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO MOVE FORWARD 
 The Supreme Court basically punted and left it all to the lower 
courts to decide how to apply its considerations outlined in Actavis to the 
rule of reason test in order to identify whether a reverse payment 
settlement withstands antitrust scrutiny.  This Note will explore how the 
lower courts should indeed apply the Court’s rule of reason analysis by 
balancing both patent and antitrust values even though the real solution 
should come from Congress.  Congress can institute legislation to help 
clean up the bad patents, which is the entire purpose of the Paragraph IV 
challenge in the first place.  Furthermore, Congress should realign the 
incentive structure in the Hatch-Waxman Act itself in order to close the 
unintentional loophole. 
A. How Lower Courts Should Apply the Rule of Reason Test 
 The lower courts are now burdened with the task of analyzing the 
specific facts of each case to determine whether the proposed reverse 
payment settlement is permissible under the Supreme Court’s rule of reason 
analysis. This will be a demanding process, requiring the fact-finder to 
weigh the anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive justifications.  
As explained in the previous section, this leeway will generate inconsistent 
decisions and create uncertainty for those parties trying to craft a reverse 
payment settlement, or potentially any settlement in any patent litigation 
case, that can withstand antitrust scrutiny. 
 This Note argues that lower courts should focus on applying a 
consistent approach in analyzing reverse payment settlements by 
implementing a stepwise approach in a “structured rule of reason” test.  
This would be consistent with the burden-shifting approach referenced by 
the Supreme Court in California Dental.132  Under this analysis, the FTC 
would have the burden of establishing a prima facie case of anticompetitive 
effect.  Once proven, the burden would shift to the defendants to establish 
cognizable procompetitive justifications.  Assuming the defendant offered 
procompetitive justifications, the FTC would then have the burden of 
attacking such justifications as pre-textual or a sham.  If the FTC cannot do 
so, the FTC must show that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the 
procompetitive benefits.  The FTC can successfully establish that the 
justifications are pre-textual or a sham without having to introduce evidence 
of the relevant market and market shares.  But, in most instances, proving 
anticompetitive effects will require the FTC to show a relevant antitrust 
market and market shares.   
                                                      
132 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
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 The anticompetitive effects can be proven by direct evidence of the 
settlement’s purpose, but, of course, that would be very difficult to do in 
practice.  In order to prove anticompetitive effects by circumstantial 
evidence, the Actavis Court provided examples to provide the lower courts 
some guidance, including the size of the reverse payment, its scale in 
relation to the payer’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence 
from other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of 
any other convincing justification.133  The Court further suggested that the 
two most important factors from the above list are the size of the payment 
and its justifications.134  In the Court’s view, “a reverse payment, where 
large and unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive 
effects.”135  An example would be where the brand-name manufacturer pays 
a generic “a sum even larger than what the generic would gain in profits if it 
won the [infringement] litigation and entered the market.”136  Such a 
payment “cannot in every case be supported by traditional settlement 
considerations” and, therefore, provides “strong evidence that the patentee 
seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of 
its monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive 
market.”137 
 This stepwise, burden-shifting approach has support from the courts 
already.138  Therefore, it would be easy to implement, easy for the parties to 
follow because of pre-existing case law, and produce more consistent 
results.  District courts should apply this analysis as part of a process for 
approving the settlement of the patent case, and could employ a special 
master or invite the FTC to participate in the proceedings.  Determining 
antitrust legality before a reverse payment settlement becomes effective 
promotes judicial efficiency by bringing the patent and antitrust issues into 
a single forum to be decided at the same time, which would provide 
additional incentive for both the brand-name and generic manufacturers to 
settle and avoid a costly, time-consuming trial.   
B. Congress Should Step In to Filter the Murky Waters 
 Congress originally enacted Hatch-Waxman to promote the public 
welfare by encouraging prompt market entry of generic drugs and fair 
                                                      
133 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 2235. 
137 Id. 
138 See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Agnew v. 
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 336 (7th Cir. 2012); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 
F.3d 1004, 1007–08 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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competition, but the Act, unintentionally, created the incentives for both 
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers to settle litigation through the 
reverse payment arrangement.  Reverse payment settlements have been 
described as atypical settlements “that dispose of the validity and 
infringement challenges central to the Hatch-Waxman scheme.”139  If this 
truly goes against Congress’s underlying intent of the statute, then Congress 
must act in order to rectify the current misinterpretations of the statutory 
meaning and intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act.140   
1. Prior Legislative (In)Action. 
 Congress has attempted to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act several 
times.  Recently, the Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 
2012 was presented by Congressman Waxman and Congressman Rush “[t]o 
prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating generic drug 
companies to delay the entry of a generic drug into the market, and for other 
purposes.”141  Unfortunately, this bill does not differ meaningfully from past 
failed efforts to regulate reverse payment and, therefore, is susceptible to 
the same criticisms.142  Congressional attempts to regulate reverse payment 
settlements have been unsuccessful due to the feared negative effects on 
generic manufacturers, including the significantly reduced incentives to file 
ANDA challenges under Hatch-Waxman.143  Congress has yet to strike the 
appropriate balance between lowering costs of drugs for consumers and 
allowing for patent holders to settle cases within their rights of their patent.  
Each of the proposed legislation has focused on the short-term goal of 
reducing prices without really solving the underlying problem of reverse 
payment settlements because lawful reverse payments can actually reduce 
costs for consumers in the long run when dealing with stronger patents (as 
explained above) and avoid wasteful investment by innovator companies in 
litigation rather than innovation. 
 In order for Congress to successfully modify the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and its progenies, Congress must recreate the incentives for settlement 
                                                      
139 Michael A. Carrier, Solving the Drug Settlement Problem: The Legislative 
Approach, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 83, 84 (2009). 
140 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2647. 
141 Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
142 See H.R. 3995; Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 
1706, 111th Cong. (2009); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 
111th Cong. (2009); Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2007, H.R. 1902, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
143 See H.R. 3995 §§ 2(c), 3 (2012). 
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for the brand-name and generic drug manufacturers.  There are many 
different suggestions on how to do so, but Congress should focus on the 
following three aspects: (1) strengthening the patent system, (2) enhancing 
predictability of patent validity disputes; and (3) reinforcing the public 
policy of encouraging private settlements. 
2. Creating Clarity by Cleaning Up Patents.   
 A patent should continue to be presumed valid in the absence of 
clear evidence proving otherwise.  The prevalence of bad patents and the 
resulting uncertainty creates costly, drawn out patent litigation.  Patents 
should be reviewed more closely at the outset, and the new changes with 
administrative proceedings under the America Invents Act144 may help to 
review patent validity more efficiently and effectively.145  Challenging the 
validity of patents through these new administrative review proceedings 
promises to be faster and less costly than litigation.  The statute provides 
that the administrative courts issue a decision within a year of instituting the 
action and, in the majority of cases,146 it appears that the board is on track to 
make a final determination of validity within about 18 months from the date 
the petition is filed.147  Because of the compressed timeline and the structure 
of the proceedings, the total cost is estimated to fall in the range of 
thousands of dollars instead of millions.148  Furthermore, challenging the 
validity of a bad patent in an administrative proceeding should have a 
                                                      
144 The America Invents Act was a huge shift in the patent world, changing our 
patent system from a first-to-invent system to match the rest of the world’s first-to 
file system.  The new patent system now rewards the inventor that first files for its 
patent instead of proving to have actually invented the innovation first.  In addition, 
the Act puts forth new administrative procedures for examining the validity of a 
patent, including ex parte review, inter partes review, transitional program for 
covered business method patents and post grant review proceedings.   
145 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
146 Id. 
147 See PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD AIA PROGRESS  
STATISTICS (2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/ 
aia_statistics_01_30_2014.pdf. 
148 According to a survey by the American Intellectual Property Law Association, a 
patent lawsuit where $1 million to $25 million is at risk will cost each party on 
average $1.7 million through the end of discovery and will cost each party on 
average $2.8 million through trial not including any damages awarded.  See Am. 
Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2013).  In comparison, 
total costs for each party in an inter partes review are currently estimated at around 
$150,000 to $300,000. Susan Decker, Google, NetApp Sidestep Courts to  
Combat Patent Claims, Bloomberg (Oct. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-14/google-to-netapp-sidestep-courts-to-
combat-patent-claims.html. 
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higher likelihood of success than challenging its validity in federal court.  
The USPTO uses a lower evidentiary standard when determining invalidity 
because a challenged patent at the USPTO is not presumed to be valid as it 
is in federal court.149  Furthermore, the USPTO uses a broader interpretation 
of patent claims when assessing whether the invention was already known 
or obvious.150  The use of these proceedings, especially inter partes review, 
has been popular for all of the stated reasons,151 but it is too early to tell if 
these changes were successful, and the efficacy and effects of these 
proceedings should be evaluated in future publications. 
 In addition to the new administrative procedures, the FDA and 
USPTO could review the validity of patents when the patents are placed on 
the Orange Book152 when the new drug is applying for FDA approval.153  
Alternatively, Congress could adopt the European system and eliminate the 
American patent linkage system of listing relevant patents on the Orange 
                                                      
149 The PTO uses a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for adjudicating 
patentability.  An examiner should reject a claim if, in view of the prior art and 
evidence of record, it is more likely than not that the claim is unpatentable. MPEP § 
706.I. 
150 The PTO determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the 
basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable 
construction “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of 
ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). The rules of the PTO require that claims “conform to the 
invention as set forth in the remainder of the specification and the terms and 
phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the 
description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by 
reference to the description.” 37 CFR 1.75(d)(1). 
151 See Robert Siminski, 6 Reasons Inter Partes Review Was Popular In 2013, LAW 
360, Dec. 17, 2013, available at http://www.law360.com/articles/495709/6-
reasons-inter-partes-review-was-popular-in-2013. 
152 The “Orange Book” is the commonly known name for FDA’s publication, 
“Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations.”  This 
publication “identifies drug products approved on the basis of safety and 
effectiveness by the [FDA]” and lists all patents covering a new drug or the 
methods of using the drug. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Approved Drug  
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book), 
 U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.fda. 
gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm129662.htm. 
153 A pioneering drug manufacturer must obtain FDA approval for its new drug by 
submitting a New Drug Application (“NDA”).  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b) (2012).  
As part of the NDA process, the manufacturer must report to the FDA all patents 
covering its drug or the methods of using the drug, “with respect to which a claim 
of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the 
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”  See 21 U.S.C. § 
355(b)(1), (c)(2) (2012).  The FDA lists all such patents in the “Orange Book.”  
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Book, allowing generic manufacturers to launch “at risk” instead of having 
to jump through the Hatch-Waxman hoops.154  This would allow the access 
to generic drugs throughout the litigation and incentivize only those 
generics that believe they will be successful at trial to launch.  This could 
result in generics only attacking those brand-name drugs in which they 
believe the patents are weak.  While these proposed solutions alone will not 
help solve the reverse payment settlement problem, it will create more 
clarity for patent litigation and clear up bad patents at the same time.   
3. Aligning Incentives with Congressional Intent by Adjusting Exclusivities. 
 The other main underlying issue of reverse payments stems from 
the Act’s 180 days generic exclusivity grant to the first generic 
manufacturer to file for FDA approval, regardless of whether or not that 
generic manufacturer succeeds in invalidating the patent or finding a way to 
avoid infringement.155  This gives both brand-name and generic 
manufacturers the incentive to settle.  The brand-name manufacturer buys 
off the first generic entrant, delaying its entry to the market, and prevents 
any other generics from entering the market until after the exclusivity 
period has expired.156  Meanwhile, the generic manufacturer settles a risky 
patent suit and retains its valuable period of generic exclusivity, which is 
where the manufacturer can often make more than half of their total profits 
on a drug.157  Essentially, both parties get to have their cake and eat it too at 
the expense of the consumers. 
 While Congress purposely gave the first-to-file generic 180 days of 
exclusivity in order to induce Paragraph IV challenges to clean up bad 
patents, perhaps Congress should adjust the exclusivity approval 
procedures.  One suggestion is for generics to forfeit exclusivities if 
settlement is reached.  Scholars have suggested that the first generic should 
only be entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period “if it successfully defeats 
the patent owner (for example, by invalidating the patent or by proving that 
it did not infringe that patent), obtains a settlement that permits entry 
                                                      
154 A recent study of litigation in the European Union revealed that even when 
disputes are few in number, they exert a strong chilling effect on generic entry as a 
result of the mere risk of interim injunctions, leading the authors to conclude the 
chilling effect of even a small number of proceedings “illustrates the strength of the 
link between patent-related exchanges and patent litigation.”  EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY FINAL REPORT 200–09 (2009). 
155 See supra Part I.A.2. 
156 Id. 
157 Daniel F. Coughlin & Rochelle A. Dede, Hatch-Waxman Game-Playing from a 
Generic Manufacturer Perspective, 25 BIOTECH. L. REP. 525, 525–26 (2006) 
(finding “[i]n general, most generic drug companies estimate that 60% to 80% of 
their potential profit for any one product is made during this exclusivity period”). 
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without delay, or can enter the market without delay because the patent 
holder does not sue for infringement.”158  Another suggestion is for 
subsequent generic challengers who are ultimately successful in invalidating 
the brand-name’s patents to obtain generic exclusivity.  These suggestions 
have their issues, of course, but both paths give Congress a start to the 
discussion on how to provide incentives that are more in line with the 
original statutory intent.    
 Meanwhile, changes made to the patent system in the America 
Invents Act may also be alleviating the current problem.  The post-grant 
review and inter partes review procedures seem to be gaining strides and 
utilization by second Paragraph IV challengers because the two procedures 
are much cheaper and quicker than traditional litigation.159  Increased 
secondary generic challengers using the new post grant review and inter 
partes review procedures could break the logjam created by the first generic 
challenger’s settlement.  By having the patent invalidated through the 
administrative procedures, there would be no barrier to entry by any 
generic.  As soon as the administrative court rules the patent invalid, the 
generic could launch with no risk of litigation.  Perhaps we would not even 
need to shift the exclusivity incentives built into Hatch-Waxman at all.  
Nevertheless, we will have to wait to see the full extent of the results 
stemming from the America Invents Act. 
CONCLUSION 
“[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty 
and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty 
generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.”160 — 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 The pharmaceutical companies, or rather their lawyers, desire 
certainty.  After the Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v. Actavis, however, 
very little is certain.  The lower courts have a significant task ahead of 
them—to agree on how to decide whether each individual reverse payment 
settlement violates antitrust laws.  Until the legal landscape is made more 
certain by consistent case law set by all of the jurisdictions, pharmaceutical 
companies may not want to settle at all, or worse, generic drug 
manufacturers may find it too risky to challenge the brand-name 
manufacturers’ patents.  This would undermine the ability for generic drugs 
to enter the market as quickly as possible, the primary purpose behind the 
                                                      
158 Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 107, at 949. 
159 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat 284 (2011). 
160 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 
(1897). 
No. 1]           DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 32 
Hatch-Waxman Act.  If Congress cannot legislate on the matter, which 
could provide ultimate clarity, perhaps the Supreme Court will need to rule 
on this issue again in the very near future.    
